

Message Text

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E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: PARM, CCD

SUBJECT: CCD: SUBMISSION OF NEW ZEALAND DOCUMENT ON
COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN

1. NEW ZEALAND EMBASSY (LARKINDALE) PROVIDED AA/MA WITH
A COPY OF LETTER AND PAPER ON COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST
BAN (CTB) THAT NEW ZEALAND MISSION IN MEVA WILL BE
TRANSMITTING TO THE UN SECRETARY GENERAL'S SPECIAL
REPRESENTATIVE TO THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON
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DISARMAMENT (CCD) WITH THE REQUEST THAT THE LETTER AND
PAPER BE CIRCULATED AS A CCD DOCUMENT. LARKINDALE SAID
THAT IT WAS THE INTENTION OF NEW ZEALAND TO CONTRIBUTE TO
THE MOMENTUM TOWARD A CTB AND THERE WAS NO DESIRE TO
COMPLICATE ISSUES THAT MAY BE UNDER CONSIDERATION AT THE
CTB TRILATERAL (US,UK, USSR) DISCUSSIONS NOW IN PROGRESS.
HE ALSO INDICATED THAT ANY US REACTION WOULD BE APPRECIATED.
2. TEXT OF LETTER: QUOTE
THE NEW ZEALAND GOVERNMENT HAS FOR SOME TIME STRESSED
THE URGENT NEED TO FOSTER PROGRESS TOWARDS NUCLEAR DIS-

ARMAMENT AND HAS TAKEN THE VIEW THAT THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP IN THIS DIRECTION IS THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

NEW ZEALAND IS THEREFORE GREATLY ENCOURAGED BY THE FACT THAT THE SUBJECT OF A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN HAS BEEN

TAKEN UP ONCE MORE BY THE CCD AND THAT THE THREE MEMBER NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES CONCERNED ARE ENTERING NEGOTIATIONS OVER A TREATY.

AT THIS PROMISING JUNCTURE, NEW ZEALAND WISHES TO MAKE KNOWN TO THE MEMBER STATES OF THE CCD ITS VIEWS ON THE ISSUES OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THE CONCLUSION OF SUCH A TREATY. MY FOREIGN MINISTER HAS ACCORDINGLY ASKED ME TO SEND YOU THE ATTACHED PAPER AND TO REQUEST YOU TO CIRCULATE IT TOGETHER WITH THIS LETTER AS AN OFFICIAL DOCUMENT OF THE CCD. END QUOTE

3. TEXT OF PAPER: QUOTE

NEW ZEALAND VIEWS ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY

THE NEED FOR A TREATY

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THE AIM OF DISARMAMENT IS TO INCREASE THE SECURITY OF EACH STATE AND THEREBY TO STRENGTHEN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. NEW ZEALAND HAS ARGUED FOR SOME TIME THAT THE HIGHEST PRIORITY IN PURSUIT OF THIS OBJECTIVE IS NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT - TO REPLACE THE BALANCE OF TERROR BY A BALANCE OF CONFIDENCE. SOME LIMITED STEPS HAVE BEEN TAKEN ALONG THIS PATH: THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP IS A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY. WITHIN THE GENERAL AIM OF IMPROVING SECURITY SUCH A TREATY WOULD HAVE TWO PURPOSES: TO HELP CURB THE ARMS RACE BY ENCOURAGING LESS RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND INCREASING THE LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE AMONG STATES; AND TO DISCOURAGE THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS THROUGH THE TREATY ITSELF AND THROUGH FULFILMENT OF THE ARTICLE VI OBLIGATIONS OF THE NPT.

THERE IS NOTHING NEW IN THIS: IT WAS FOR THESE REASONS THAT THE PARTIES TO THE PARTIAL TEST BAN TREATY OF 1963 AND THE NON PROLIFERATION TREATY OF 1968 PLEDGED THEMSELVES TO STRIVE FOR THE CONCLUSION OF A COMPLETE BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPON TESTS. IT IS THE LACK OF PROGRESS OVER THESE MANY YEARS TOWARDS FULFILMENT OF THAT PLEDGE THAT LEADS NEW ZEALAND TO APPEAL ONCE AGAIN TO THE MEMBER STATES OF THE CCD TO ADDRESS THEMSELVES URGENTLY AND SERIOUSLY TO THE TASK OF PREPARING A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY.

NEGOTIATIONS HAVE BEEN DELAYED IN THE PAST BY FEARS OF SOME STATES THAT A LEVEL OF PERFECTION COULD NOT BE ACHIEVED IN THE TREATY'S PROVISIONS AND THAT ANY IMPERFECTIONS THEREIN WOULD POSE AN UNACCEPTABLE THREAT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE STATES PARTIES. AS NEGOTIATIONS COMMENCE, IT IS NEW ZEALAND'S HOPE THAT THE

STATES MOST DIRECTLY INVOLVED WILL ACCEPT THAT PERFECTION OF THIS NATURE IN DISARMAMENT IS RARELY POSSIBLE. THERE ARE RISKS IN ANY NEW DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT: BUT AN LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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AGREEMENT THAT FALLS SHORT OF THE BEST OF ALL POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES MAY NEVERTHELESS BE IN THE BROADER INTERESTS OF EACH STATE'S NATIONAL SECURITY, AND OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY IN GENERAL. THE PROCESS AND THE RESULTS OF GENUINE NEGOTIATIONS IN THIS COMMITTEE CAN MAKE A MAJOR CONTRIBUTION TO THE DEVELOPMENT OF GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND SECURITY.

THE MAIN AREAS OF DIFFICULTY WOULD APPEAR TO BE THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL PARTICIPATION BY ALL NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES, THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE VERIFICATION OF A COMPLETE BAN, AND THE QUESTION WHETHER OR NOT TO PERMIT PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS UNDER A TEST BAN TREATY.

THE PROBLEM OF UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE

THE CONSIDERABLE LEAD IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS POSSESSED BY THE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWERS WOULD SEEM TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE SCOPE FOR THEIR ADHERENCE TO A TEST BAN IN ADVANCE OF CHINA AND FRANCE. THEIR CONTINUED SECURITY CAN BE SAFEGUARDED BY THE VARIOUS PROVISIONS IN THE CCD PERMITTING THEM TO WITHDRAW SHOULD THEIR SUPREME INTERESTS BE JEOPARDISED.

THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY SHOULD BE A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE STEP TOWARDS THE IMPROVEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY THAN A CONTINUED INSISTENCE ON MOVING AT THE PACE OF THE MOST RELUCTANT. MOREOVER A DECISION BY THE MORE SOPHISTICATED NUCLEAR POWERS TO CEASE EVEN UNDERGROUND TESTING SHOULD WEAKEN THE ARGUMENTS OF THOSE WHO HAVE SO FAR REFUSED TO ACCEPT ANY LIMITATIONS ON TIR TESTING PROGRAMMES AND ENABLE INTERNATIONAL OPINION TO EXERT MORE EFFECTIVE PRESSURE FOR UNIVERSAL ADHERENCE TO A LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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COMPLETE BAN. THE RECENT COMMENCEMENT OF NEGOTIATIONS

BY THE THREE CCD NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES IS A HOPEFUL
SIGN THAT THIS VIEW IS GAINING WIDER ACCEPTANCE.

THE PROBLEM OF VERIFICATION

THE EXTENT TO WHICH OBSERVANCE OF A BAN ON TESTING CAN
BE VERIFIED IS A MATTER OF CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE. THE
WORK OF THE EXPERT SEISMIC GROUP IS THEREFORE VALUABLE
IN POOLING EXISTING KNOWLEDGE AND CREATING THE FOUNDATION
ON WHICH AN EFFECTIVE INTERNATIONAL TELESEISMIC NETWORK
CAN BE CONSTRUCTED. WE HOPE THAT THE GROUP WILL ALSO
HELP TO STIMULATE THE DEVELOPMENT OF MORE ACCURATE
DETECTION TECHNIQUES AND THAT WITHIN A SHORT TIME A

NETWORK CAN BE RELIED ON TO DETECT EXPLOSIONS DOWN TO
A VERY LOW YIELD. NEW ZEALAND WILL COOPERATE FULLY IN
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUCH A NETWORK. IT WOULD APPEAR
HOWEVER THAT THERE IS A THRESHOLD TO ANY TELESEISMIC
DETECTION CAPABILITY LIKELY TO BE DEVELOPED IN THE
FORESEEABLE FUTURE BELOW WHICH CALANDESTINE TESTS MIGHT
BE CONDUCTED.

OTHER METHODS OF VERIFICATION WILL STRENGTHEN THE
VERIFICATION CAPABILITY OF AN INTERNATIONAL SEISMIC
NETWORK. FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE NATURE AND SITING
OF UNMANNED FIRST-ZONE SEISMIC STATIONS WOULD BE REQUIRED
BEFORE THIS METHOD COULD BE USEFULLY INTEGRATED INTO AN
INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION SYSTEM. OTHER NATIONAL
TECHNICAL MEANS (SUCH AS SATELLITE PHOTOGRAPHY) WILL ALSO
BE OF PRIME IMPORTANCE FOR SOME STATES IN RAISING THE
LEVEL OF CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFICATION OF A TREATY.
PROVISION FOR AN AGREED FORM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION WILL
ALSO BE A USEFUL SUPPLEMENT TO THE VERIFICATION OF THE
TREATY. BUT THE ESSENTIAL CONSIDERATION, IN NEW ZEALAND'S
VIEW, IS A RECOGNITION THAT FOR EACH STATE THE LEVEL
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OF CONFIDENCE IN THE VERIFICATION OF THE TREATY'S
PROVISIONS IS ALREADY ADEQUATE FOR A TREATY TO BE CON-
CLUDED: EVEN THOUGH THIS MAY NOT ENTIRELY EXCLUDE THE
POSSIBILITY OF VERY LOW YIELD TESTS BEING CARRIED OUT.
IT SEEMS THAT THERE WILL ALWAYS REMAIN AN ULTIMATE LIMIT
TO THE OVERALL VERIFICATION CAPABILITY OF A COMPREHENSIVE
TEST BAN AS WITH ANY DISARMAMENT AGREEMENT. TO FORGO A
CTB ON THE GROUNDS THAT THE EXISTING POSSIBLE VERIFICATN
CAPABILITY IS INADEQUATE MIGHT THEREFORE BE TO DEFER A
CTB INDEFINITELY. THIS IS ESSENTIALLY A POLITICAL
JUDGEMENT, AND THE DECISION MUST ACCORDINGLY BE MADE ON
A BROADER BASIS THAN THE PURELY TECHNICAL CONSTRAINTS
OF THE TIME.

THE PROBLEM OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

THE INSEPARABLE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS (PNES) AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TECHNOLOGY HAS BEEN ONE OF THE PROBLEMS DELAYING THE CONCLUSION OF A CTB. ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES AS THEY RELATE TO PNES ARE TWO FOLD:

(A) TO ENSURE NO PROLIFERATION OF WEAPON TECHNOLOGY TO NON NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THROUGH PNES CONDUCTED ON THEIR TERRITORY; AND

(B) TO ENSURE NO MILITARY ADVANTAGE TO NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES THROUGH PNES CONDUCTED ON EITHER THEIR OWN

TERRITORY OR ON THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES.

IT APPEARS TO BE POSSIBLE TO MEET THE FIRST OBJECTIVE BY MEANS OF APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL OBSERVATION LIMITED OFFICIAL USE LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

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PROCEDURES UNDER AGREEMENTS PROVIDED FOR BY ARTICLE V OF THE NPT AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH GUIDELINES ALREADY ESTABLISHED BY THE IAEA. ATTAINMENT OF THE SECOND OBJECTIVE, HOWEVER, IS HANDICAPPED BY THE FACT THAT NO EXISTING OR FORESEEABLE TECHNOLOGY OR VERIFICATION PROCEDURE CAN DISTINGUISH BETWEEN PEACEFUL AND WEAPON TEST EXPLOSIONS. THE CHOICE LIES, THEREFORE, BETWEEN CONCLUDING A CTB THAT HAS THIS LOOPHOLE, OR CLOSING THE GAP THROUGH PERMANENT OR TEMPORARY CONSTRAINTS ON PNES.

ONE MAJOR NUCLEAR POWER AIMS IT HAS DEVELOPED PROVEN ECONOMIC USES FOR PNES, AND OTHER COUNTRIES HAVE EXPRESSED INTEREST IN USING THIS TECHNOLOGY FOR MAJOR DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS. ALTHOUGH THEIR USEFULNESS IS NOT YET UNIVERSALLY RECOGNIZED, THERE WOULD SEEM AT LEAST TO BE A POTENTIAL IN THIS FIELD OF TECHNOLOGY WHICH DEMANDS RECOGNITION, AND WHICH MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN A CTB. AT THE SAME TIME, GIVEN THE TECHNOLOGY, THE PNE INTEREST MUST BE SUBORDINATED TO THE OVERRIDING NEED TO CEASE WEAPON TESTING IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY. PNES SHOULD THEREFORE BE PROSCRIBED UNTIL IT IS ESTABLISHED THAT THE OBJECTIVES OF PEACEFUL NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY ARE NOT PURSUED AT THE COST OF THE TWO PRINCIPAL ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES.

SINCE NONE OF THE ANNOUNCED PROJECTS APPEARS READY TO PROCEED IN THE NEAR FUTURE, THE WAY SEEMS OPEN TO PROVIDE FOR A MORATORIUM ON PNES UNTIL SATISFACTORY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVES ARE AGREED.

CONSIDERATION MAY NEED TO BE GIVEN TO INCLUDING AN
EXCEPTION FOR EMERGENCY PNEs FOR SUCH PPOES AS THE
SEALING OF OIL AND GAS LEAKS WHICH BY THEIR NATURE
SEEM UNLIKELY TO PROVE SIGNIFICANT WEAPONS-RELATED
BENEFITS. A TREATY SHOULD CONTAIN EXPLICIT PROVISION,
HOWEVER, THAT "NON EMERGENCY" PNEs WILL NOT BE CONDUCTED
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IN THE TERRITORIES OF BOTH NUCLEAR AND NON-NUCLEAR
WEAPON STATES UNTIL CLEAR AGREEMENT HAS BEEN REACHED
THAT NO MILITARY ADVANTAGE WILL BE DERIVED FROM TH.
A CTB SHOULD NOT AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF SUCH AGREEMENT
LEST THIS NECESSITATE FURTHER UNACCEPTABLE DELAYS.
THE SPEED WITH WHICH AGREEMENT IS REACHED WILL PROVE
IN PART TO BE A MEASURE OF THE REAL IMPORTANCE OF
PNE TECHNOLOGY. FAILING THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANY
THEORETICAL OR TECHNOLOGICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN PNEs

AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS, IT MAY BE THAT THE ONLY WAY OF ENS
ENSURING THAT NO MILITARY ADVANTAGE IS GAINED FROM A PNE
IS BY AGREEMENT TO POOL THE INFORMATION, INCLUDING
INTERNAL DESIGN AND ALL OTHER DESCRIPTIVE INFORMATION,
WITH ALL OTHER NUCLEARWEAPONS STATES PARTIES TO THE
TREATY, THROUGH STRICT INTERNATIONAL VERIFICATION
PROCEDURES. WHETHER SUCH AGREEMENT IS ULTIMATELY
REACHED, AND IN WHAT FORM, SHOULD BE REGARDED AS
SECONDARY TO THE PRIMARY AIM OF CONCLUDING A CTB.

CONCLUSION

IN REITERATING ITS VIEW THAT THERE IS AN URGENT NEED
TO CONCLUDE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY IN THE
INTERESTS OF ALL STATES, NEW ZEALAND RECOGNIZES THE
NECESSITY TO RESOLVE WITHOUT DELAY THE CONFLICTING
ARGUMENTS THAT HAVE HELD UP A TREATY SO FAR. IN OUR
VIEW THE ADVANTAGES OF STOPPING NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS
AND TAKING THIS MAJOR STEP TOWARDS GENERAL DISARMAMENT
AND IMPROVING INTERNATIONAL SECURITY HEAVILY OUTWEIGH
THE RISKS INVOLVED IN EACH OF THE THREE PROBLEM AREAS.
WE BELIEVE IT IS IN THE INTERESTS OF NATIONAL SECURITY
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES AS WELL AS NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
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STATES, TO STOP NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS. TO WAIT FOR
TECHNOLOGY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS WOULD NOT ONLY DISPLAY
A LACK OF POLITICAL COURAGE, IT WOULD BE TO WAIT
INDEFINITELY AND PERHAPS FOR EVER. NEW ZEALAND GREATLY
HOPES THAT ALL STATES, AND PARTICULARLY THOSE NUCLEAR

WEAPON STATES DIRELY INVOLVED IN THE NEGOTIATIONS,
WILL FIND IT POSSIBLE TO DISPLAY THE POLITICAL COURAGE
NEEDED AND TO REACH AGREEMENT ON A COMPREHENSIVE TEST
VAN TREATY IN TIME FOR SIGNATURE AT THE SPECIAL
SESSION ON DISARMAMENT NEXT YEAR. THE SESSION WILL
PROVIDE THE BEST OCCASION IN WHICH TO SECURE EARLY AND
GENERAL RATIFICATION OF THE TREATY. THERE COULD BE NO
GREATER GUARANTEE OF A SUCCESSFUL SESSION. ENDQUOTE. VANCE

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